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ABSTRACT
As personal data have been the new oil of the digital era, there is a
growing trend perceiving personal data as a commodity. Although
some people are willing to trade their personal data for money, they
might still expect limited individual privacy loss, and the maximum
tolerable privacy loss varies with each individual. In this paper,
we propose a framework that enables individuals to trade their
location data streams under personalized privacy loss, which can
be bounded in w successive time points. However, the introduc-
tion of such personalized bounds of individual privacy loss over
streaming data raises several technical challenges in the aspects of
budget allocation, utility estimation of personalized differentially
private mechanism, and arbitrage-free pricing. To deal with those
challenges, we modularize three key modules in our framework and
propose arbitrage-free trading mechanisms by combining instances
of the modules. Finally, our experiments verify the effectiveness of
the proposed mechanisms.
KEYWORDS
streaming data, budget allocation, personalized differential privacy,
arbitrage-free, privacy loss bound
1 INTRODUCTION
Personal data, the new oil of the digital era, are extraordinarily
valuable for individuals and organizations to discover knowledge
and improve products or services. However, data owners’ personal
data have been exploited without appropriate compensations. Many
giant Internet companies, like Facebook1 and Google2, provide free
web services in exchange of the rights to collect, use or share their
customers’ personal data with no payment, but each user might
deserve a monetary compensation of approximately 4 dollars by
Facebook or 24 dollars by Google [4]. Worse yet, as personal data
reflects the unique value and may release sensitive information
of individuals, data owners may be nervous of the possibility that
1https://www.facebook.com/legal/FB_Work_Privacy
2https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en-US
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their privacy is not properly protected. A study shows that a com-
pensation, especially monetary one, reduces people’ expectations
for privacy protection [12], which implies that some data owners
would like to provide their privacy in exchange of money. In fact,
there is a growing trend towards personal data trading perceiving
personal data as a commodity, which meets the demand of both
data buyers and data owners. Some startup companies, such as Dat-
acoup3 and CitizenMe4, consider personal data trading platform
that connects data owners (i.e., who generate the data) and data
buyers (i.e., who want to utilize personal data) directly as a new
business model.
Figure 1: Location Data Marketplace
Several studies [13][17][18][19][21] in the literature investigated
privacy-preserving query-based data trading as shown in Figure 1.
There are three parties in the data trading: data owners, data buyers,
and a market maker. Data owners contribute their personal data and
get monetary compensations from the market maker in return. Data
buyers request queries over the data and pay for the perturbed query
answers, noisy versions of aggregate statistical results where some
random noises are injected. The market maker acts as a trustworthy
intermediary between data owners and data buyers, in charge of
computing a perturbed query answer, calculating the query price
for data buyers and compensating data owners. A major challenge
in the line of works is how to determine the price of the data. A
seminal work of Li et al.[19] made the connection between privacy
loss and the price of data by pricing function. They proposed an
important property of pricing function: arbitrage-freeness, which
means the consistency of a set of priced queries. Intuitively, a buyer
should not obtain the answer to a query more cheaply by deriving
the answer from a less expensive set of queries.
However, there are several insufficiencies in such a marketplace
when each data owner contributes their location data continuously.
First, data owners should be able to bound their privacy loss given
the high sensitivity of trajectories. In the traditional data market-
place shown in Figure 1, a data buyer can purchase raw data and
3http://datacoup.com/
4https://citizenme.com/
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data owners cannot control the upper bound of their privacy loss.
Our recent user survey [20] shows that most users value privacy or
other criteriamore important than the financial compensationwhen
monetizing their data, which supports our argument that money
cannot buy everything. Second, the existing studies [13][19][21]
guarantee uniform privacy loss from each data owner; however,
it is more natural that different data owners have quite diverse
expectations on tolerable privacy loss [14].
In this paper, we study trading infinite location data streams
with bounded individual privacy loss. There are three challenges in
solving the problems mentioned above. First, as individual privacy
loss is bounded, the problem of budget allocation raises. Because
the utility of the query answer is also bounded in that case, some
queries in request of high utility may be infeasible. On the other
hand, data owners may want their privacy losses within the bound
to be completely sold out so that their revenue would be maximized.
Consequently, the market maker needs a strategy allocating the
budget of privacy loss, in order to make full use of personal data for
data owners and decrease the number of infeasible query requests
for data buyers.
Second, personalized privacy losses make it more difficult to
design an arbitrage-free pricing function. As the query price de-
pends on the utility of the query answer while the privacy losses
determine the payments to data owners, we should find the map-
ping between the utility and privacy losses in order to design the
pricing function. Given the list of data owners’ privacy losses, it
is easy to calculate the utility of the query answer perturbed by
some specific perturbation mechanism. On the contrary, if the data
buyer requests a query with a specific utility value, sometimes it
is hard to find the corresponding privacy loss of each data owner
to perturb the query answer due to the personalized bounds. Even
if we succeed in finding the mapping, how to guarantee that the
pricing function is arbitrage-free so that arbitrage behaviors are
prevented is still a very tricky problem if such mapping is complex.
Third, the setting of infinite streaming data brings great com-
plexity to budget allocation and arbitrage-freeness. As the market
maker should protect every sequence of data points of each data
owner occurring in w successive time points, the task of privacy
budget allocation concerns not only the privacy losses at a single
time point, but also on the timeline. If the market maker goes a
further step to let each owner personalize the parameter w , the
length of the sequence, the situation will become more complicated
because the distribution pattern of all the data owners’ privacy
budgets will change over time. Such time-varying pattern raises
great complexity of finding an arbitrage-free function, since the
function should be fixed for the whole timeline and therefore a
fixed distribution pattern of privacy budgets would be better.
Contributions
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
First, we designed a new trading framework where each owner
is enabled to set her own privacy preferences, including the person-
alized bound of individual privacy loss and personalized sliding-
window size as parameters of PersonalizedW-event Privacy. We
proposed several timeline budget allocation algorithms to appro-
priately allocate privacy budgets over the timeline, so that privacy
losses are sold as much as possible for data owners within their
bounds. The experimental results show that our Seize-the-moment
algorithm significantly outperforms other baseline algorithms.
Second, in order to achieve better utility for data buyers under
the constraint of arbitrage-freeness, we designed a point budget al-
location algorithm called Grouping for the Sample mechanism [14]
which achieves Personalized Differential Privacy [14]. We found
that the combination of the Sample mechanism and Grouping be-
haves well when the number of data owners are relatively small and
can always decrease the minimum affordable variance for query
answers.
Third, we designed arbitrage-free tradingmechanisms for stream-
ing data consisting of threemodules:TimelineBudgetAlloc,Point-
BudgetAlloc, andPerturbMech. In order to easily design arbitrage-
free pricing functions, we proved a theorem presenting the suffi-
cient conditions in which the utility function of some perturbation
mechanism will result in an arbitrage-free pricing function. Then,
we found that if the parameter of the Grouping algorithm satisfies
some limitation, the Sample mechanism will meet such conditions
in the theorem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic settings in our framework. Section 3 gives a whole view of
our trading framework. Section 4 discusses the technical details in
the modules of our framework. Section 5 presents the experimental
results. Section 6 introduces the related work and finally Section 7
draws a conclusion.
2 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we introduce the basic settings in our framework
including the notions concerning pricing queries, our privacy defi-
nition and problem formulation.
2.1 Pricing Queries
Before the discussion of our problems, we first clarify the definition
of location data streams and the queries in our framework, and the
notion of arbitrage-freeness.
Location data stream. A location data point is the basic element
in a location database. The market maker collects location data
points of data owners at intervals. All of data points are grouped
into location databases Dt by time point t , and each Dt contains
n data points. A location data stream is a set of infinite location
databases and a stream prefix is composed of finite ones. We note
that each owner contributes only one location data point at a single
time point.
Figure 2: Location Data Stream
Definition 2.1 (Stream Prefix). A location data point is a triple
p = (u, t , l) where u is a user’s identity, t is the time point and l is the
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location, u, t , l ∈ Z+. We write pti to denote the location data point
of the data owner i at the time point t . A stream prefix is a sequence
Sτ = (D1, ...,Dτ ) where Dt = {pt1, ...,pti , ...,ptn } is a set of location
data points collected at the time point t .
Counting Query. For simplicity, we assume data buyers are inter-
ested only in counting query, i.e., histogram, which is a primitive of
many complicated data analysis methods. A location database Dt
can be transformed into a counting vector ct = (ct1, ..., ctd )T where
the element ctl is the total number of data owners who was in the
location l at the time point t and d is the number of locations. The
answer of a counting queryQ over the database Dt is the vector ct .
Arbitrage-free Pricing Functions. Given the above query, we use the
variance v to measure the utility of query answers. Thus, the price
of a query answer depends only on the variance. Our definition of
arbitrage-free is derived from the definition in [19].
Definition 2.2 (Arbitrage-Free). A pricing function π (v) is
arbitrage-free if, for every multiset V = {v1, ...,vm } wherem ∈ Z+,
if there exists a1, ...,am such that
∑m
k=1 ak = 1 and
∑m
k=1 a
2
kvk ≤ v ,
then
π (v) ≤
m∑
k=1
π (vk )
2.2 Privacy Definition
As we are going to trade personal data with bounded individual
privacy loss and there is no fixed definition of privacy, we also
should define the privacy metric in our framework. To preserve
data owners privacy, the true query answer cannot be returned
to the buyer and the market maker should perturb the answer by
some perturbation mechanism achieving a formal privacy standard.
We follow the setting of [19] to use differential privacy as a privacy
metric. The idea of differential privacy, in brief, says that we should
guarantee that the output will change very slightly if any data point
in the database changes.
In ϵ-differential privacy, the value of privacy protection metric ϵ
is uniform for all the data owners (or data points). However, the fact
that data owners are allowed to set their maximum tolerable privacy
losses in our framework requires personalized privacy protection
level of each data point. Therefore, we employ the personalized dif-
ferential privacy as our privacy protection standard. In personalized
differential privacy [14], a privacy loss ϵi is a personalized privacy
protection metric, and a privacy specification Φ is a mapping from
data owners to their privacy losses.
Definition 2.3 (Neighboring databases). Two location databases
D,D ′ ⊂ D are neighboring if D ′ can be derived from D by replacing
one location data point with another location data point, denoted as
D ∼ D ′. We write D ui∼ D ′ to denote D and D ′ are neighboring and
differ on the location l of the data point pi corresponding to the data
owner ui .
Definition 2.4 (Personalized Differential Privacy [14]).
Given a privacy specification Φ = {(ui , ϵi )|ui ∈ U }, a perturbation
mechanismM : D → R satisfies Φ-personalized differential privacy,
if for any pair of neighboring databases D,D ′ ⊂ D, with D ui∼ D ′,
and for any o ∈ O ⊆ R, we have:
Pr [M(D) = o] ≤ eϵi Pr [M(D ′) = o]
However, Personalized Differential Privacy still just protects
statistics derived from a static database and cannot be directly
applicalbe to streaming data. As the w-event privacy [16] works
well in streaming scenarios, we employs a personalizedW-event
privacy whereW = {(ui ,wi )|ui ∈ U } is a window specification
mapping from data owners to their preferred sliding-window sizes
wi . We write Sτ = (D1, ...,Dτ ) to denote a stream prefix. Two
stream prefixes Sτ , Sτ ′ arewi -neighboring [16] if:
(1) there are at most wi pairs of such neighboring databases
Sτ [t], Sτ ′[t], t ∈ [τ ], and
(2) if two databases Sτ [t], Sτ ′[t] are not neighboring, then Sτ [t] =
Sτ ′[t], and
(3) all the neighboring pairs are in awi -length window.
Definition 2.5 (Personalized W-event Privacy). Given a
privacy specification Φ = {(ui , ϵi )|ui ∈ U }, a window specification
W = {(ui ,wi )|ui ∈ U }, a mechanismM that takes a stream prefix
as input satisfies Φ-personalized W-event privacy, if for any pair
of wi -neighborbing stream prefixes Sτ , Sτ ′, with any pair of their
neighboring elements Sτ [t] ui∼ Sτ ′[t], t ∈ [τ ], any τ , and any o ∈
O ⊆ O where O is the set of all possible outputs ofM, we have:
Pr [M(Sτ ) = o] ≤ eϵi Pr [M(Sτ ′) = o]
Theorem 2.1. LetM1, ...,Mτ be a set of mechanisms where each
independent perturbation mechanism Mt satisfies Φt -personalize
differential privacy and Mt (Dt ) = ot . Let M be a mechanism
which takes a stream prefix Sτ = (D1, ...,Dτ ) as input and outputs
(M1(D1), ...,Mτ (Dτ )). Then,M satisfies Φ-personalizedW-event
privacy if for any t ∈ [τ ] and any ui , we have
t∑
j=t−wi+1
ϵ
j
i ≤ ϵi
We proves our theorems in the appendix.
Theorem 2.2 (The Laplace Mechanism [10][14]). Given a func-
tion f : D → R and a database Dt , the Laplace mechanism
that returns f (Dt ) + Lap(∆f /ϵ) satisfies Φt -personalized differen-
tial privacy, in which ∆f = maxDt∼Dt ′
f (Dt ) − f (Dt ′)1 and
Φt = {(ui , ϵ)|ui ∈ U }.
Theorem 2.3 (The Sample Mechanism [14]). Given a function
f : D → R, a database Dt and a privacy specification Φt =
{(ui , ϵi )|ui ∈ U }, the Sample mechanism samples each data point
pti ∈ Dt with probability
Pri =
{
eϵ
t
i −1
eh−1 , i f ϵ
t
i < h
1,otherwise
where mini ϵti ≤ h ≤ maxi ϵti is a configurable threshold, and then
executes the Laplace mechanism to return f (SDt )+Lap(∆f /h) where
∆f = maxSDt∼SDt ′
f (SDt ) − f (SDt ′)1 and SDt is the sampled
database of Dt . The Sample mechanism satisfies Φt -personalized
differential privacy.
2.3 Problem Formulation
There are three parties of participants in our marketplace: data
owners, data buyers, and a market maker. Each party has its own
interests and goals.
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Data Buyers. A data buyer can request a query with a specific
utility and get a perturbed query answer c˜t where t is a time point.
We define our utility metric as the maximum variance of c˜t , referred
to as the required variance v , such that Var [c˜t [i]] ≤ v for all i . We
set the query price π (v) determined only by the required variance
v . For the sake of data buyers, for the samev , we endeavor to lower
the π (v). Also, for the same query price, the lower variance, the
better.
Data Owners. Data owners are the source of location data. Each
data owner ui contributes her unique data point pti at each time
point t . Each data owner i should specify her maximum tolerable
privacy loss ϵˆi for any her sequence of data points occurring inwi
successive time points, referred to as privacy loss bound ϵˆi , and the
sliding-window size wi . Let ϵti be the data owner i’s privacy loss
due to the query answer c˜t . We also define our utility function as
v = U (·)which takes as input [ϵt1 , ..., ϵtn ] and outputs the maximum
variance v mentioned above. In order to achieve the personalized
W-event privacy, for each data owner i , we should mare sure that:
∀τ ,
τ∑
t=τ−wi+1
ϵti ≤ ϵˆi (1)
Data owners make a contract with the market maker who com-
pensates them according to a compensation function µ(·). Each
owner’s compensation µ(ϵti ) = cr · ϵti only depends on her privacy
loss ϵti where cr > 0 is a global compensation rate. Thus, within
their privacy loss bounds, they want their privacy losses to be con-
sumed as much as possible, so that they can gain more money in
return. Hence, the goal of the data owner i can be defined as:
min{ϵˆi −
τ∑
t=τ−wi+1
ϵti }
TheMarketMaker: Themaker acts as a trustworthy intermediary
between data owners and data buyers. For each query occurring at
t , the maker should ensure that the query price π t is not less than
the sum of compensations µti :
π t ≥
∑
i
µti =
∑
i
µ(ϵti ) =
∑
i
cr · ϵti
Themaker is also supposed to guarantee that the pricing function
π (v) is arbitrage-free as defined in 4.1.
3 PERSONAL DATA TRADING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give a whole view of our trading framework and
introduce it from both the perspectives of trading at a singe time
point and over the whole timeline. We summarize some important
notations in Table 1.
3.1 Framework Overview
Figure 3 illustrates our trading framework containing three phases:
Offer, Quote, and Delivery. Once the maker updates the current
time point τ , she executes the process of timeline budget allocation
to allocate timeline privacy budgets. Then if the maker receives a
query request, she allocates point privacy budgets and announces
the minimum affordable variance checkv to the buyer. After the
buyer chooses the requiredv ≥ checkv , the maker quotes the query
price of this v . In case the maker receives the payment from the
Table 1: Summary of Notations
Notation Description
ui data owner i
pti ui ’s data point occurring at the time point t
n the number of users, or the size of each database
τ the current time point
t the index of time point
wi ui ’s preferred sliding-window size
c˜t perturbed query answer of Dt
v the required variance
(the maximum variance of c˜t )
vˇ the minimum affordable variance to the buyer
ϵˆi data owner ui ’s privacy loss bound
ϵˆti timeline privacy budget for data point p
t
i
ϵ¯ti point privacy budget for data point p
t
i
ϵti privacy loss for data point p
t
i
µti the compensation for ui at the time point t
µ(·) the compensation function, µti = µ(ϵti )
U (·) the utility function which outputs v
Figure 3: Trading Framework
buyer, she compensates data owners, calculates the privacy losses
based on the v , and delivers a perturbed query answer c˜t to the
buyer. For simplicity of our discussion, we assume that only one
perturbed query answer can be requested at each time point.
3.2 At A Single Time Point
At the current time point τ , the procedure of streaming data trading
includes the following phases.
Offer: In the phase of Offer, at the beginning, the buyer requests a
query Qτ over the database Dτ . Then, the market maker executes
the process of point budget allocation. That is, given the list of time-
line privacy budgets [ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτn ], the maker calculates point privacy
budget ϵ¯τi for each data owner ui by some point budget allocation
algorithm. Finally, the maker uses a utility function U ([ϵ¯τ1 , ..., ϵ¯τn ])
to return the minimum affordable variance vˇ of the query answer
to the buyer.
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Quote: Given the minimum affordable variance vˇ , the buyer should
choose a variance v > vˇ . Then, the market maker should calcu-
late each owner’s privacy loss ϵτi for this variance by the inverse
function of the utility function. Then, the market maker uses the
following function to price the query:
π (v) = (1 + r ) ·
∑
i
µi (ϵi ) = (1 + r ) ·
∑
i
cr · ϵi
where r is the rate of profit for the market maker and cr is the rate
of compensation. We note that there are many ways to design an
arbitrage-free pricing function, even independent of the compen-
sation function µ(ϵi ). We consider a practical setting in which the
market maker can charge portion of the cost (compensations) as
her profit.
Dilivery: In the phase of Delivery, the buyer pays the price π (v) to
the market maker and receives a perturbed query answer with the
required variancev in return. The answer is perturbed by a specific
perturbation mechanism which achieves personalized W-event
privacy.
3.3 Streaming Data Trading
From the perspective of trading data in a streaming timeline, we
need another procedure to allocate timeline privacy budgets {ϵˆ1i , ..., ˆϵτi }
for each data owner’s data points {p1i , ...,pτi } under the constraint
of personalizedW-event privacy as shown in Eq. 1. That is to say,
at the time point t , for any data owner i , the sum of the privacy
losses for the previous successivew − 1 data points and the to-be-
allocated budget should be no more than the privacy loss bound of
owner i . Thus, we have the following timeline privacy constraint.
Definition 3.1 (Timeline Privacy Constraint). For any cur-
rent time point τ , for any data owner i , we should guarantee that:
τ−1∑
t=τ−wi+1
ϵti +
ˆϵτi ≤ ϵˆi
Hence, as shown in Alg. 1, there are three key modules in our
streaming data trading framework:
• TimelineBudgetAlloc,
• PointBudgetAlloc, and
• PerturbMech.
Algorithm 1 Streaming Data Trading
Input: required variance v
Output: perturbed query answer ˜cτ
1: for i = 1 to len(Dτ ) do
2: ˆϵτi ← TimelineBudgetAlloc(ϵˆi , τ , [ϵˆ 1i , ..., ˆϵτ−1i ], [ϵ 1i , ..., ϵτ−1i ]);
3: end for
4: [ϵ¯τ1 , ..., ϵ¯τn ] ← PointBudgetAlloc([ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτn ]);
5: Calculate vˇ using [ϵ¯τ1 , ..., ϵ¯τn ];
6: if v < vˇ then
7: return Rejection;
8: else
9: Calculate the privacy losses [ϵτ1 , ..., ϵτn ];
10: Calculate the compensations µ(ϵτi ) and the price π (v);
11: Collect the buyer’s payment and compensate the owners;
12: return ˜cτ ← PerturbMech(Dτ , [ϵτ1 , ..., ϵτn ]);
13: end if
Wenote that every data owner i can change her own privacy pref-
erences including her privacy loss bound ϵˆi and preferred sliding-
window sizewi , at any time. Once an owner changes such person-
alized parameters, it will come into effect at the next time point
τ + 1 and for future, which means the level of privacy guarantee
will be unchanged for the time points 1 to τ . For example, if ui dose
not want to sell her data point at the next time point τ + 1, he can
notify the maker and then the parameter ϵˆi will be equal to zero so
that she will suffer no privacy loss. However, for simplicity of our
discussion, we just considers the case where no data owner changes
her privacy preferences. Also, since data owners might be confused
how to set the value of ϵˆi (orwi ), the maker could instruct them by
giving some intuitive explanations (e.g., the combination of ϵˆi = 10
andwi = 2 may result in a low level of privacy guarantee).
4 PROPOSED TRADING MECHANISMS
In the previous section, we have introduced the trading framework.
In this section, we discuss the technical details in the modules of
the framework.
4.1 Instantiating Modules
We instantiate the three key modules in our trading framework
with different strategies. We design three strategies (Algorithm 2, 3,
4, 5) for TimelineBudgetAlloc in Subsection 4.1.1, two strategies
(Algorithm 6, 7) for PointBudgetAlloc in Subsection 4.1.2.
4.1.1 TimelineBudgetAlloc. We note that our Alg. 2, 3, 5 guar-
antee that there is always privacy budget remained for the next
time point for each data owner. As for Alg. 4, the privacy budget
will be exhausted at most once for each owner.
Strategy 1: Timeline Uniform (Alg. 2). For each data owner ui ,
Timeline Uniform just allocates ϵˆi/wi to each data point of ui . In
this way, the privacy budgets {ϵˆ1i , ..., ˆϵτi } for a single owner are
uniform. However, because each privacy budget ˆϵτi might not be
used up and it is always fixedly allocated, the remained privacy
budget ˆϵτi − ϵτi never influences the next time of timeline budget
allocation, which causes much of the maximum tolerable privacy
loss ϵˆi might be wasted. For the sake of the party of data owners,
this strategy leaves much to be desired.
Algorithm 2 Timeline Uniform (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
Input: ϵˆi
Output: ˆϵτi
1: return ϵˆi /wi ; //wi is a global constant.
Strategy 2: Proportional Allocation (Alg. 3). For each data
owner ui , Proportional Allocation forever allocates a fixed propor-
tion pro of the total remained privacy budget 12 (ϵˆi −
∑τ−1
t=τ−wi+1 ϵ
t
i )
to ui ’s data point. This strategy takes the remained privacy budget
into consideration so that less of ϵˆi is wasted; it also guarantees
that there forever is privacy budget remained for future.
If pro = 1, it puts all emphasis on the current time point and
provides the locally best result for the coming query. However, a
locally best result not necessarily leads to a globally best result. If
the buyer exhausts the owner ui ’s timeline privacy budget ˆϵτi , at
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Algorithm 3 Proportional Allocation (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
Input: ϵˆi , [ϵˆ 1i , ..., ˆϵτ−1i ], [ϵ 1i , ..., ϵτ−1i ]
Output: ˆϵτi
1: losses ← ∑τ−1t=τ−wi+1 ϵ ti ; //wi is a global constant.
2: return (ϵˆi − losses) ∗ pro; //pro is a global constant.
the next time point τ + 1, there will be no privacy budget for ui and
thus the variance of the query answer infinitely high.
Strategy 3: Seize-the-moment (Alg. 4). Seize-the-momentmeans
it always allocates as much privacy budget as possible at the mo-
ment. At the first time point 1, it is a special case of Proportional
Allocation where the fixed proportion proS is 1. At the time point
τ , for the owner ui , once the buyer exhausts her timeline privacy
budget ˆϵτi , Seize-the-moment decreases the fixed proportion proi
for her. If buyers use up ui ’s timeline privacy budgets all the time,
the proS for ui will be 0.5.
Algorithm 4 Seize-the-moment (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
Input: ϵˆi , [ϵˆ 1i , ..., ˆϵτ−1i ], [ϵ 1i , ..., ϵτ−1i ]
Output: ˆϵτi
1: losses ← ∑τ−1t=τ−wi+1 ϵ ti ; //wi is a global constant.
2: count ←Calculate the times ϵˆ ti = ϵ ti for t = 1 to τ − 1
3: proS ← 1.0 − 0.5 ∗ ( countτ−1 );
4: return (ϵˆi − losses) ∗ proS ;
Figure 4: Example of Seize-the-moment
Example 4.1. Consider the data ownerui ’s data points {p1i , ...,p4i },
and assumewi = 2, ϵˆi = 6, as shown in Figure 4. At the time point 1,
Seize-the-moment allocates ϵˆ1i = 6 to p
1
i . Then the buyer requests a
query exhausting all the ϵˆ1i . Consequently, at time point 2, the privacy
budget ϵˆ2i is 0 and there could be no privacy loss. Thus, at the time
point 3, the pro for ui drops down to 0.5. But as ϵ3i = 2 < ϵˆ
3
i = 6, at
the time point 4, the proS recovers and rises to 23 .
Strategy 4: Budget Absorption (Alg. 5). Budget Absorption acts
as an improved version of Timeline Uniform. To each data point pτi ,
at first it allocates the uniform budget ϵˆi/wi as Timeline Uniform
does, and then additionally allocates the previous remained budget
ˆϵτ−1i − ϵτ−1i . Thus, the privacy budget for pτi might be equal to
ϵˆi/wi + ˆϵτ−1i − ϵτ−1i . However, if the total remained budget ϵˆi −∑τ−1
t=τ−wi+1 ϵ
t
i is less than ϵˆi/wi + ˆϵτ−1i − ϵτ−1i , it just allocates
ϵˆi −∑τ−1t=τ−wi+1 ϵti to pτi .
Example 4.2. Consider the data owner ui ’s data point stream
prefix {p1i , ...,p4i }, and assumewi = 3 and ϵˆi = 6. As shown in Figure
Algorithm 5 Budget Absorption (TimelineBudgetAlloc)
Input: ϵˆi , [ϵˆ 1i , ..., ˆϵτ−1i ], [ϵ 1i , ..., ϵτ−1i ]
Output: ˆϵτi
1: ˆϵτi ← ϵˆi /wi ; //wi is a global constant
2: if τ > 1 then
3: absorption ← ˆϵτi + ˆϵτ−1i − ϵτ−1i
4: losses ← ∑τ−1t=τ−wi+1 ϵ ti ; //sum the total losses in the window;
5: r emaininд ← ϵˆi − losses ;
6: ˆϵτi ←min(absorption, r emaninд);
7: end if
8: return ˆϵτi ;
Figure 5: Example of Budget Absorption
5, at the time point 4, the sum of the uniform budget ϵˆi/wi = 6/3 = 2
and the previous remained budget ϵˆ3i − ϵ3i = 4− 1 = 3, which is equal
to 2+ 3 = 5, is more than the total remained budget ϵˆi −∑4−1t=4−3+1 ϵti
to p4i = 6 − (1 + 1) = 4. Hence Budget Absorption chooses 4 as the
privacy budget.
4.1.2 PointBudgetAlloc.
Strategy 1: User Uniform (Alg. 6). Since the privacy budgets
ˆϵτi might be different, we should further allocate privacy budgets,
because some perturbation mechanism, such as the Laplace mech-
anism, requires the uniform privacy losses for data owners. User
Uniform finds the minimum privacy budget min{ ˆϵτi }, and then
allocates it to all the data points. Thus, the point privacy budgets
ϵ¯τi =min{ ˆϵτi } are uniform.
Algorithm 6 User Uniform (PointBudgetAlloc)
Input: [ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτn ]
Output: [ϵ¯τ1 , ..., ϵ¯τn ]
1: return [min([ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτi ]), ..., min([ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτi ])];
Strategy 2: Grouping (Alg. 7). As User Uniform just outputs
uniform point privacy budgets, timeline privacy budgets might
be too far from full use. In order to sell more privacy losses and
increase the minimum affordable variance of the query answer, we
have to enable part of data owners to suffer more privacy loss than
the minimum privacy budget. Thus, Grouping sorts the owners
by their timeline privacy budgets ˆϵτi and divides them into two
groups by a configurable proportion α ∈ (0, 1): α of owners with
poor privacy budgets ϵpoor , and 1 − α with rich privacy budgets
ϵr ich . We write ϵthreshold to denote the minimum timeline privacy
budget in the rich group. Then, it allocates:
ϵpoor =
{
mini ˆϵτi , i f k ·mini ˆϵτi ≤ ϵthreshold
ϵthreshold/k,otherwise
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Algorithm 7 Grouping (PointBudgetAlloc)
Input: [ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτn ]
Output: [ϵ¯τ1 , ..., ϵ¯τn ]
1: ϵpoor ←min([ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτn ]);
2: identif ier ← int (α ∗ n); //α is a global constant;
3: ϵr ich, ϵthreshold ← sor ted ([ ˆϵτ1 , ..., ˆϵτn ])[identif ier ];
4: if ϵpoor < ϵr ich/k then
5: ϵr ich ← ϵpoor ∗ k ; //k is a global constant
6: else
7: ϵpoor ← ϵr ich/k ;
8: end if
9: for i = 1 to n do
10: ϵ¯τi ← ϵr ich ;
11: if ˆϵτi < ϵthreshold then
12: ¯ϵτi ← ϵpoor ;
13: end if
14: end for
15: return [ϵ¯τ1 , ..., ϵ¯τn ];
to the poor group as their point privacy budgets, and
ϵr ich =
{
k ∗mini ˆϵτi , i f k ·mini ˆϵτi ≤ ϵthreshold
ϵthreshold ,otherwise
to the rich group, in which thek > 1 is a configurable parameter.We
note thatmini ˆϵτi is the minimum timeline privacy budget among
all the data owners, rather than among those in one of the two
groups.
Example 4.3. Consider the example as shown in Figure 6. We group
the owners by α = 0.5, and the k is equal to 6. Thus, the minimum
timeline budgetmini ˆϵτ1 is the owner u1’s ˆϵ
τ
1 , and the minimum time-
line budget in the rich group is the owner u3’s ˆϵτ3 . Because ˆϵ
τ
3 < 6 · ˆϵτ1 ,
Grouping allocates ˆϵτ3 /6 = 3/6 = 0.5 to each member in the poor
group, and ˆϵτ3 = 3 to each in the rich.
Figure 6: Example of Grouping
4.2 Integrating Modules
Because TimelineBudgetAlloc can be freely combined with the
other two modules, PointBudgetAlloc and PertubMech, we just
discuss the integration of the latter two modules in this subsection.
Utility Sub-function. As mentioned above, the distribution pat-
tern of all the data owners’ privacy budgets will change over time.
Such time-varying pattern raises great complexity of finding an
arbitrage-free function, because the function should be fixed for the
whole timeline and a fixed distribution pattern of privacy budgets
(or privacy losses) would be better. Hence, we attempts to fix the
distribution pattern such that we can create a mapping between
a single user’s privacy loss ϵti and the variance v . Let U´ (·) be the
utility sub-function which takes as input a single ϵti and outputs
v . Because for the same query answer, data owners’ privacy losses
might be different while there is only one maximum variance v ,
which means the utility sub-function for each ϵti might also be
different. For owners whose privacy losses are the same and equal
to ϵj , they are mapped into the same utility sub-function U´j (·).
Laplace-base Mechanism: TimelineBudgetAlloc + User Uniform
+ Laplace. User Uniform fits the Laplace mechanism because the
owners receive uniform privacy losses by the Laplace mechanism.
By the combination of User Uniform and the Laplace mechanism, at
each time point t , the utility sub-function for each owner is uniform:
v = U´ (ϵti ) =
2·(∆f )2
(ϵ ti )2
= 8(ϵ ti )2
.
Sample-baseMechanism: TimelineBudgetAlloc +Grouping + Sam-
ple. The utility function of the Sample mechanism is complex and
even different for each time point because the distribution pattern
of privacy losses is time-varying. Hence, we have to make efforts
to fix the utility function. Grouping ensures that at each time point
t , there are only two kinds of privacy losses, ϵpoor and ϵr ich with
ϵpoor =
ϵr ich
k , which makes the distribution pattern of privacy
losses uniform over time. That means there are n · α owners falling
into the poor group, and n · (1 − α) into the rich. By the combina-
tion of Grouping and the Sample mechanism, we have the utility
sub-function:
U´i (ϵti ) =

U´p (ϵti ) = n · α · e
ϵ ti −1
ek ·ϵ
t
i −1
· (1 − eϵ
t
i −1
ek ·ϵ
t
i −1
) + 8(k ·ϵ ti )2 , i f ϵ
t
i = ϵpoor
U´r (ϵti ) = n · α · e
ϵ ti
k −1
eϵ
t
i −1
· (1 − e
ϵ ti
k −1
eϵ
t
i −1
) + 8(ϵ ti )2 , i f ϵ
t
i = ϵr ich
where n is the number of data owners and α is the rate of Grouping.
Arbitrage-freeness Guarantees. As shown above, we bind the
Laplace and Sample mechanisms with Uniform and Grouping, re-
spectively; also, the utility function depends on the combination
of the algorithm and mechanism. That is because, we found that,
given a perturbation mechanism, the point budget allocation al-
gorithm must guarantee that the utility function has some certain
properties so that the pricing function is arbitrage-free, as shown
in the Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. Given a perturbation mechanism, if each utility
sub-function v = U´j (ϵj ) satisfies the following conditions:
(1) decreasing, which means U´ ′j (ϵj ) < 0,
(2) limϵj→0+ U´j (ϵj ) = +∞,
(3) U´j (ϵj ) · U´ ′′j (ϵj ) − 2 · [U´ ′j (ϵj )]2 ≤ 0
then the pricing function π (v) = (1+r ) ·cr ·∑j nj ·ϵj is arbitrage-free,
where nj is the constant number of owners whose utility sub-function
is U´j (ϵj ).
For the Laplace-basemechanism, obviously, the utility sub-function
is decreasing, limϵ ti →0+ U´ (ϵ
t
i ) = +∞, and U´ (ϵti ) · U´ ′′(ϵti ) − 2 ·
[U´ ′(ϵti )]2 ≤ 0. Hence, according to Theorem 4.1, the pricing func-
tion πLap (v) = (1 + r ) · cr · n · ∆f√
v/2 is arbitrage-free.
SIGSPATIAL’19, November 2019, Chicago, Illinois, USA Shuyuan Zheng, Yang Cao, and Masatoshi Yoshikawa
For the Sample-base mechanism, the pricing function is derived
as:
πSam (v) = (1+r )
∑
i
cr ·ϵti = (1+r )·cr ·[n·α ·U´ −1p (v)+n·(1−α)·U´ −1r (v)]
Unfortunately, πSam (v) is not always arbitrage-free: we found
that the parameterk in the utility sub-functions affects the arbitrage-
freeness of πSam (v) as shown in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2. If the k ≥ 1
1
2−
√
21
14
, the pricing function πSam (v)
is arbitrage-free.
Proof. If k > 2, then U´ ′p (ϵti ) < 0 and U´ ′r (ϵti ) < 0. If k ≥
1
1
2−
√
21
14
, both the utility sub-functions satisfy U´j (ϵti ) · U´ ′′j (ϵti ) − 2 ·
[U´ ′j (ϵti )]2 ≤ 0, j ∈ {p, r }. In addtion, both two functions satisfies
limϵ ti →0+ U´ (ϵ
t
i ) = +∞. Thus, according to Theorem 4.1, πSam (v)
is arbitrage-free. □
Thus, if we set the k not less than 1
1
2−
√
21
14
, then we will derive an
arbitrage-free pricing function for the Sample-base mechanism.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct several sets of experiments to testify
which timeline budget allocation strategy performs better in terms
of selling more privacy losses for data owners, and on the other
hand, which perturbation mechanism (with corresponding point
budget allocation strategies) in terms of achieving better utility for
data buyers.
Settings. Because of the lack of real-world datasets which fit in
with the needs of our settings, we generate datasets by program-
ming including a stream prefix of location databases, a dataset
of data owners with their privacy loss bounds, and a dataset of
queries. In this paper, because we do not consider any data correla-
tion (which will be considered in our future work), the locations
in our location databases are randomly picked for simplicity. The
parameters of each dataset is summarized as shown in Table 2. Each
data owner ui randomly belongs to a group with regard to ϵˆi/wi ,
her average maximum tolerable privacy loss to each data point
which is also generated randomly. We note that the size of each
database is equal to the number of users n.
Table 2: Parameters of Experiments
Parameter Default Value
number of databases τ 100
number of locations d 20
number of users n 100
range of ϵˆi/wi (conservative) [0.5, 1.5]
range of ϵˆi/wi (ordinary) [1.5, 2.5]
range of ϵˆi/wi (liberal) [2.5, 3.5]
standard sliding-window sizew 6
range of sliding-window sizewi [w − 1,w + 1]
the rate of compensation cr 1.0
the rate of Grouping α 0.5
the scale for the Sample mechanism k 6.0
5.1 Effect on Selling Privacy Losses
Request the same variance v. Figure 8 illustrates the effect of
different combinations of allocation strategies and perturbation
mechanisms. Data buyers the same required variance for all the
time points, and outputs the average privacy loss among all the
data points. As we can see, for the Laplace-base mechanism, Seize-
the-moment outperforms the others, which means it can help sell
more privacy losses. For the Sample-base mechanism (combined
with Grouping), Seize-the-moment also works best for low variance.
However, with the required variance increasing, the gap between
each strategy’s performance narrows and disappears finally. Hence,
if buyers always want accurate queries, the superiority of Seize-
the-moment will be highlighted. Unsurprisingly, Timeline Uniform
performs the worst where even no privacy loss is sold when the
required variance is low.
Varying the standard sliding-window sizew . Then we want to
know the impact of window size. This time for each query the buyer
randomly choose a required variance v more than the minimum
affordable variance vˇ . As shown in Figure 9, it seems that the sliding-
window size has slight impact on the average privacy loss. That is
mainly because the average bound per window ˆϵi/wi for each ui
is fixed and Time Uniform forever allocates it to each data point.
On the contrast, Seize-the-moment still performs the best for all
the set of sliding-window sizes and for both the Laplace-base and
Sample-base mechanisms. Proportional Allocation behaves better
and better with thew increasing, from the worst to even the second
best, probably because it can allocates more privacy budget to a
single data point when the sliding-window size is higher.
5.2 Effect on Achieving Higher Utility
Impact of the number of users n. As we can see in Figure 9, the
Sample-base mechanism is more sensitive to the number of users n.
When n = 100, for the same required variance, the maker quotes
higher prices if perturbs the query by the Laplace-base mechanism.
When n = 400, however, the situation reverses where the Sample-
base mechanism results in more payments. Recall the utility sub-
functions of the two mechanisms. We can find that only the utility
sub-functions of the Sample-base mechanism involve the n while
the Laplace-base mechanism’s is independent of it. Hence, with the
increase of the n, the average price per owner or the compensation
to each owner stays the same in the Laplace-base mechanism but
linearly rises in the Sample-base mechanism. In addition, whichever
the n is, some extremely low values of the required variance cannot
be requested in the Laplace-base mechanism, which means the
Sample-base mechanism can supply choices of more accurate query
answers.
Actual utility. Since the required variance v is the variance in the
worst case which satisfiesVar [c˜t [i]] ≤ v for all i , the next step is to
measure the actual utility of the query answers. As shown in Figure
11, in the Laplace-base mechanism, there is almost no difference
between the required variance and the actual variance; but in the
Sample-base mechanism, the actual variance is obviously lower
than the required one, which means that the buyer may obtain
a more accurate query answer than she expects. In addition, for
the Laplace-base mechanism, MSE must be equal to the required
variance, since it causes no bias, and the experimental results also
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Figure 8: Effect of timeline budget allocation strategies Figure 9: Impact of sliding-window size on average privacy loss
Figure 9: Impact of the number of users
Figure 11: Impact of perturbation mechanisms on utility Figure 12: Impact of an exceptional owner
confirm it. On the other hand, the Sample-base mechanism some-
times brings bias but the results seemingly show that the MSE is
also lower than the required variance as it is the variance in the
worst case.
Impact of an exceptional owner. Although we randomly gen-
erate three groups of users with privacy loss bounds which are
randomly chosen , further we want to experiment on the special
cases where an exceptional owner with an extremely low bound
join in. We vary such extremely low bound below the floor of the
range of ϵˆi/wi of the conservative group, which is equal to 0.5. As
shown in Figure 12, the Laplace-base mechanism is highly sensitive
to the lowest bound while it seems to have so slight influence on
the Sample-base mechanism that the latter can cope better in cases
where there is an extremely conservative data owner.
6 RELATEDWORK
Personal Data Trading. Balazinska et al. [2] guides the tendency
of research on Data Market for the database research community.
In recent years, personal data or individual privacy loss has been
perceived as a commodity. Ghosh et al. [13] designed markets for
trading statistics over private data and the privacy loss at auctions.
Then, Riederer et al. [22] focused on allowing users to decide which
part of their personally identifiable information for sale in the
auction. Koutris et al. [18] proposed the original model of query-
based pricing which no negotiation is allowed in terms of pricing.
Li et al. [19] adapted the query-based model with the constraint of
arbitrage-free and privacy preservation by differential privacy. Nget
et al. [20] analyzed people’s privacy attitude and thus attempted
to limit the bound of privacy loss for data owners. Niu et al. [21]
proposed a pricing framework trading common aggregate statistics
over correlated data. As for location data, a data-sharingmechanism
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and decision framework was proposed by Aly et al. to estimate the
expected value of a single data point and make purchasing decisions
[1]; Kanza et al. [15] also presented a geosocial marketplace taking
privacy protection into account.
Differentially Private Streaming Data Release. The research on differ-
entially private streaming data was initiated by the work of Dwork
et al. [9]: event-level DP which protects at most one single event,
and user-level DP which hides all the events of each user. Their
another work [11] focused on finite data streams and a binary tree
is constructed to inject an appropriate noise. Then, Chan et al. [8]
adapted such technique for infinite streams. Bolot et al. [3] proposed
the notion of decayed privacy to reduce the privacy protection level
of previous data. Recently, Kellaris et al. [16] tackled the limitations
of event-level DP and user-level DP, and introduced the notion of
w-event privacy where a sliding window methodology is applied.
They also proposed budget allocation algorithms budget distribu-
tion (BD) and budget absorption (BA) which allocate portion of
the entire privacy budget for approximation of data publishing
and portion for data perturbation. Wang et al. [23][24] further pro-
posed an adaptive budget allocation algorithm which dynamically
computes the portion to increase the utility of the released data.
Then, in order to personalize the fixed parameterw of window size,
and the rate of data points being generated, Cao et al. [5] extended
w-event privacy to l-trajectory privacy. Also, they investigated data
correlations in streaming data which causes temporal privacy loss,
and proposed mechanisms to bound such privacy loss [6][7].
7 CONCLUSION
We have proposed a trading framework for location data streams
where each data owner’s privacy loss under personalized w-event
differential privacy is bounded for the sake of data owners. The
formalized problems to be solved in our framework can be further
modularized as TimelineBudgetAlloc, PointBudgetAlloc, and Perturb-
Mech. Thus, we designed several instances for each module and
combined them as two kinds of arbitrage-free trading mechanisms.
Finally, we conducted several sets of experiments with synthesis
datasets to evaluate the performance of each mechanism in mak-
ing full use of privacy budgets and achieving better utility. The
results show that the Sample-base mechanism with Grouping im-
proves the utility when the number of data owners is small, and
Seize-the-moment can sell more privacy losses.
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A PROOFS
Theorem A.1. LetM1, ...,Mτ be a set of mechanisms where each
independent perturbation mechanism Mt satisfies Φt -personalize
differential privacy and Mt (Dt ) = ot . Let M be a mechanism
which takes a stream prefix Sτ = (D1, ...,Dτ ) as input and outputs
(M1(D1), ...,Mτ (Dτ )). Then,M satisfies Φ-personalizedW-event
privacy if for any t ∈ [τ ] and any ui , we have
t∑
j=t−wi+1
ϵ
j
i ≤ ϵi (2)
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Proof. For any pair ofwi -neighboring stream prefixes Sτ , Sτ ′
with any pair of their neighboring Dt ui∼ Dt ′, any τ and any output
o = (o1, ...,oτ ) ∈ O ⊆ O, Due to Definition 2.4, we have:
∀t ∈ [τ ], Pr [Mt (Dt ) = ot ] ≤ eϵ ti Pr [Mt (Dt ′) = ot ]
Because eachMt is independent, we have:
Pr [M(Sτ ) = o] =
τ∏
t=1
Pr [Mt (Dt ) = ot ]
Because Sτ , Sτ ′ are wi -neighboring, there is t ∈ [τ ] such that
Dk = Dk ′ for k ∈ [1, t −wi ] ∪ [t + 1,τ ]. Then, we have:
Pr [M(Sτ ) = o]
Pr [M(Sτ ′) = o] =
∏t
k=t−wi+1 Pr [Mk (D
k ) = ok ]∏t
k=t−wi+1 Pr [Mk (Dk ′) = ok ]
≤
t∏
k=t−wi+1
eϵ
k
i = e
∑t
k=t−wi +1 ϵ
k
i ≤ eϵi
Thus,M satisfies Φ-personalizedW-event privacy. □
Theorem A.2. Given a perturbation mechanism, if each utility
sub-function v = U´j (ϵj ) satisfies the following conditions:
(1) decreasing, which means U´ ′j (ϵj ) < 0,
(2) limϵj→0+ U´j (ϵj ) = +∞,
(3) U´j (ϵj ) · U´ ′′j (ϵj ) − 2 · [U´ ′j (ϵj )]2 ≤ 0
then the pricing function π (v) = (1+r ) ·∑j nj ·cr ·ϵj is arbitrage-free,
where nj is the constant number of owners whose utility sub-function
is U´j (ϵj ).
Proof. Let h(x) = U´ −1j ( 1x )(x > 0), according to Lemma A.1, we
have h′′(x) ≤ 0. Because limϵj→0+ U´j (ϵj ) = +∞, limx→0+ h(x) =
limx→0+ U´ −1j ( 1x ) = limv→+∞ U´ −1j (v) = 0. Then, according to
Lemma A.2, we have:
h(x) + h(y) ≥ h(x + y)
Then, for anymultisetv1, ...,vm and anya1, ...,am such that
∑m
k=1 ak =
1 and
∑m
k=1 a
2
kvk ≤ v , according to Lemma A.3, we have:
ϵj = U´
−1
j (v) ≤
m∑
k=1
U´ −1j (vk )
Then, we have:
π (v) = (1 + r ) ·
∑
j
nj · cr · U´ −1j (v) ≤ (1 + r ) ·
∑
j
nj · cr ·
m∑
k=1
U´ −1j (vk )
=
m∑
k=1
(1 + r ) ·
∑
j
nj · cr · U´ −1i (vk ) =
m∑
k=1
π (vk )
□
Lemma A.1. Let U (ϵ) be a decreasing and twice-differentiable
function, andh(x) = U −1i ( 1x )(x > 0). IfU (ϵ)·U ′′(ϵ)−2·[U ′(ϵ)]2 ≤ 0,
then h′′(x) ≤ 0.
Proof. BecauseU (ϵ) is decreasing,U (ϵ) has its inverse function
and U −1(v) is decreasing, which means U −1 ′(v) < 0. Then, we
have:
U (ϵ) ·U ′′(ϵ) − 2 · [U ′(ϵ)]2 ≤ 0
⇒v · [− U
−1 ′′(v)
(U −1 ′(v))3 ] − 2 · (
1
U −1 ′(v) )
2 ≤ 0
⇒v ·U −1 ′′(v) + 2 ·U −1 ′(v) ≤ 0
⇒ 1
x
·U −1 ′′( 1
x
) + 2 ·U −1 ′( 1
x
) ≤ 0
⇒ 1
x4
·U −1 ′′( 1
x
) + 2
x3
·U −1 ′( 1
x
) ≤ 0
⇒h′′(x) = U −1 ′′( 1
x
) · [( 1
x
)′]2 +U −1 ′( 1
x
) · ( 1
x
)′′ ≤ 0
□
Lemma A.2. Let h(x)(x > 0) be a twice-differntiable and con-
tinuous function. Then, for any 0 < x ≤ y, if h′′(x) ≤ 0 and
limx→0+ h(x) = 0, h(x) is sub-additive which means h(x) + h(y) ≥
h(x + y), .
Proof. Let f (x) =
{
0,x = 0
h(x),x > 0 . Because limx→0+ f (x) =
limx→0+ h(x) = 0 and f (0) = 0, f (x) is right-continuous for x = 0.
Therefore, f (x) is continuous for x ≥ 0. Then, for any 0 ≤ x ≤ y,
we have:
f (x) + f (y) − f (x + y) = [f (x) − f (0)] − [f (x + y) − f (y)]
=(x − 0) · f ′(ξ1) − (x + y − y) · f ′(ξ2) = x[f ′(ξ1) − f ′(ξ2)]
=x · (ξ1 − ξ2) · f ′′(ξ3) ≥ 0
Then, for any 0 < x ≤ y, we have:
h(x) + h(y) − h(x + y) = f (x) + f (y) − f (x + y) ≥ 0
□
Lemma A.3. Let f (v) be a decreasing function such that h(x) =
f ( 1x ) is sub-additive, which means h(x) + h(y) − h(x + y) ≤ 0. For
any multiset v1, ...,vm and any a1, ...,am such that
∑m
k=1 ak = 1
and
∑m
k=1 a
2
kvk ≤ v , we have f (v) ≤
∑m
k=1 f (vk ).
Proof.
f (v) ≤ f (
m∑
k=1
a2kvk ) = f (
∑m
k=1 a
2
kvk
(∑mk=1 ak )2 ) ≤ f (
∑m
k=1 a
2
kvk
(∑mk=1 a2kvk ) · (∑mk=1 1vk ) )
= f ( 1∑m
k=1
1
vk
) = h(
m∑
k=1
1
vk
) ≤
m∑
k=1
h( 1
vk
) =
m∑
k=1
f (vk )
□
